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Controlling Jury Damage Awards in Private Antitrust Suits
Legal commentators have long realized that juries often base decisions on emotional or nonevidential factors. 1 Professor Kalven,
dean of the jury behavior researchers, found that jury decisions
spring from the "response of the jury's common sense equity when
confronted with formal legal rules." 2 While recognizing this phenomenon, commentators vigorously disagree about its desirability.
Many have praised this feature of the jury system because it tempers
strict rules of law with notions of fairness and justice.3 Other commentators have criticized jury flexibility for creating uncertainty for
the litigating parties and for subverting clear legislative decisions.4
Treble damage antitrust suits provide a unique context for this
debate on jury equity. Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that a
private plaintiff who successfully brings an antitrust action shall recover treble damages from the defendant. 5 In a jury trial, the jury
I. Clarence Darrow, speaking of criminal juries, took the extreme view that "U]urymen
seldom convict a person they like, ·or acquit one that they dislike. The main work of a trial
lawyer is to make a jury like his client or, at least, to feel sympathy for him; facts regarding the
crime are relatively unimportant." E. SUTHERLAND & D. CRESSEY, CRIMINOLOGY 431 (9th ed.
1974) (quoting Clarence Darrow).
For empirical support that juries do sometimes base decisions on nonevidential factors, see
H. KALVEN & H. ZElSEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 104-17 (1964); J. MARSHALL, LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONFLICT 146, 153-54 (2d ed. 1980): Scheflin & Van Dyke, Jury Nullffecation,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 51, 69-71 (1980).
The textual discussion should not be confused with the debate on jury nullification. Jury
nullification refers to the power of the jury in criminal cases to disregard the law and acquit
the defendant. Commentators have debated whether criminal juries should be instructed that
they have this power. See Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra, at 52-55.
2. Kalven, The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury .Damage Award, 19 OHIO ST. L.J.
158, 164 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Personal Injury .Damage Award].
Kalven does not argue that juries ignore the law whenever it suits them. To the contrary,
he argues that judge and jury decisions in most cases are identical. See Kalven, The .Dignity of
the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055, 1064-65 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Civil Jury]. He believes that juries, on average, will tend to follow their equitable propensities more thanjudges,
see H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 1, at 320-21, but these propensities only enter into
jury decisions when the case is close on the evidence. Personal Injury .Damage Award, supra, at
172.
3. See, e.g., C. JOINER, CIVIL Jusnc~ AND THE JURY 35-38 (1962); Scheflin & Van Dyke,
supra note 1, at 69-72; Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HARV. L.
REV. 1281, 1286 (1950).
4. See, e.g., J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 127-35 (1949); Green, Juries and Justice, 1962 u.
ILL. L.F. 152.
5. The statute provides in pertinent part
[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore in any district court of the United States
• • • and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of the suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee.
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). This statute supersedes Section 7 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 210
(1890), which only provided treble damages for Sherman Act violations. This provision
awards treble damages for violations of any of the "antitrust laws."
In 1980, Congress amended this provision. Congress gave the trial judge discretion to
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determines the economic loss suffered by the plaintiff as a result of
the violations,6 and the court trebles that amount.7 Any jury manipulation of the damage award - that is, any damage determination
based on nonevidential factors - is tripled in magnitude by this
provision.
This Note takes the position that the courts should better control
jury manipulation in private antitrust actions. Part One suggests
that manipulation is likely in such actions, and argues that this manipulation offends the legislative judgment reflected in the trebling
provision without leading to more equitable results. Part Two
presents two complementary proposals to control jury manipulation
of treble damage awards. These proposals aim to induce the jury to
return accurate awards based on the econ6mic loss actually suffered
by the plaintiff.
I.

JURY MANIPULATION IN ANTITRUST CASES

This Part examines the likelihood and consequences of jury
deviation from actual losses in awarding antitrust damages. An initial examination suggests that juries aware of the trebling rule will
reduce damages to compensate for a perceived windfall, while juries
unaware of the trebling rule may respond to perceptions of equity by
awarding damages in excess of the plaintiffs actual losses. Either
possibility offends the legislative judgment fixing the recovery for
antitrust violations at three times the losses sustained by the plaintiff.
This analysis makes out a compelling case for better guiding the
jury's determination of damages in civil antitrust actions.
A. The Likelihood of Jury Manipulation

Since a principle justification for the use of juries is their ability
to temper the strict language of the law, one would expect some
deviation between the level of damages dictated by the law and the
award the plaintiff interest on actual damages running from the date the suit is filed. Antitrust
Procedural Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-349, sec. 4(a)(l), § 4, 94 Stat. 11S6
(1980) (to be codified at IS U.S.C. § 15).
6. The statute refers to "damages by him [the plaintift] sustained." 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976),
For the plaintiff to recover, he must prove some injury. Once there is proof of injury, courts
relax the burden of proof on the amount of economic loss. E.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v, Hazeltine Research, Inc., 39S U.S. 100, 123-2S (1969); 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW
§§ 343, 34S (1978). Methods of proving damages are varied and complex. See, e.g., Lanzillotti, Problems ofProofofJ)amages in Antitrust Suits, 16 ANTITRUST BULL. 329 (1971) (detailing statistical problems of the different theories of recovery).
1. E.g., Noble v. McClatchy Newspapers, S33 F.2d 1081, 1090-91 (1977). As this Note
went to press, the Seventh Circuit decided MCI Commn. Corp. v. ATT, Nos, 80-2171, 80-2288
(7th Cir., Jan. 12, 1983) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Newer file). The court upheld
some of the jury's findings of liability, but remanded the case for a retrial on damages o~y,
consistent with other appellate findings regarding liability.· As the jury award, when trebled,
amounted to nearly two billion dollars, the decision illustrates very well the potential dimensions of the issue.
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amount actually awarded by the jury. This common sense conclusion is supported by the observations of attorneys in antitrust cases8
and other contexts.9 Judges, too, have recognized the possibility of
jury manipulation. 10
While little direct evidence confirms these apprehensions of jury
manipulation in antitrust cases, 11 some research does indicate that
significant manipulation of damages occurs in civil jury trials. In a
study of some 4,000 trials, 12 Kalven and Zeisel found that in cases
where both the judge and jury agreed that the plaintiff should recover, 13 there was "considerable disagreement on the level of damages." 14 In these cases, the jury awarded plaintiffs twenty percent
8. See, e.g., Blecher, The Plaint!lfs Viewpoint, 38 ANTITRUST L.J. 76, 76-77 (1968-1969)
(jury decisions are "motivated by emotional factors," just as in any other kind of case).
9. See, e.g., E. SUTHERLAND & D. CRESSEY, supra note I, at 431 (quoting Clarence
Darrow).
10. Concern over this possibility frequently leads judges to instruct the jury not to treat
corporate defendants differently from other defendants or to restrict their award to compensatory damages. See notes 29 & 72 iefra. Judges deciding whether juries should be informed
that their antitrust awards will be trebled have also expressed concern about the possibility of
jury manipulation. See note 21 infra and accompanying text.
11. See Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 500 F.2d 659,667 (5th Cir. 1974) (no empirical data on
the effect of informing the jury of trebling coupled with a cautionary instruction). The research conducted for this Note did not disclose any empirical study of the impact of a treble
damage instruction on jury behavior in antitrust cases. The best available evidence thus appears to be reports of interviews with jurors in antitrust cases conducted after trial; though at
best fragmentary, these interviews support the notion that juries would reduce awards if informed of trebling. See note 23 iefra.
12. The results of this study are discussed in Civil Jury, supra note 2. This study was part
of the University of Chicago Jury Project, a massive empirical and experimental study of jury
behavior. Kalven and Zeisel published a volume on the study of criminal juries. See H.
KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note I. Unfortunately, the promised companion volume on civil
jury behavior was never published. The data on civil juries are scattered among numerous
books and law review articles.
To assess the behavior of juries, the Jury Project researchers decided to determine the level
of disagreement between juries and the judges presiding over the jury trial. To determine how
the judge would have decided the case, judges presiding over jury trials were given questionnaires at the end of each trial. If the judge disagreed with the jury verdict, the judge was asked
to explain the reasons for the disagreement. Id. at 45-46. The accuracy of this method of
determining the reason for disagreement is, therefore, dependent on the judges' ability to infer
the reasons for the juries' decisions.
In addition to this empirical work, the Project interviewed jurors after trials, ran public
opinion polls and "tried" cases before mock juries. For a further description of the various
techniques, see Breeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744 (1959).
The researchers realized these methods were not perfect, but still felt they were able to
approximate actual jury behavior patterns. See H. Kalven & H. Zeise!, supra note l, at 3-54;
Personal Injury .Damage Award, supra note 2, at 159 n.4, 172 n.38. Other researchers have
been far more vehement in their criticisms. See M. BALDWIN & M. McC0NVILLE, JURY TRIALS 6-8 (1979). Still others have strongly criticized Baldwin and McConnville for their research methodology. See Hastie, Book Review, 79 MICH. L. REV. 728, 728-33 (1981).
13. Kalven reported that the presiding judges agreed with the jury's decision on liability
79% of the time. Civil Jury, supra note 2, at 1065.
14. Id. at 1065.
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more on average than the judge would have awarded.1 5 The major
reason for this disagreement was that juries incorporated their notions of "common sense equ.ity" 16 into the legal standard of
compensation. 17
In antitrust cases, the jury's awareness of the treble damage provision probably will affect significantly its notion of equity. The majority of courts have refused to inform juries of the trebling provision
or have held that it is error to do so. 18 These courts assume that
juries are typically unaware that the damage award will be trebled. 19
Judges fear that if juries are informed of the trebling provision they
will consider it a windfall to the plaintiff and will lower the award to
15. Id Though this is true on average, the judge would have awarded more than the jury
in thirty-nine percent of the cases.
16. Personal Injury .Damage Award, supra note 2, at 164. See Civil Jury, supra note 2, at
1065-66; H. KAI.VEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 1, at 495. Other researchers have suggested that
factors other than equitable considerations may have an important bearing on jury decisions.
For example, studies have found that a defendant's unpleasant personality traits, see, e.g.,
Izzet & Sales, Person Perception and Juror's Reactions to .Defendants, in 2 PERSPECTIVES IN
LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY 209, 216-17 (1981), and even physical attractiveness, can affect the
decisions of mock juries. See, e.g.' M. SAKS & R. HASTIE, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN COURT
154-60 (1978).
17. In explaining jury behavior, Kalven and others emphasize that they are talking about
"tendencies," not absolute laws of jury decision-making. See, e.g., Personal Injury .Damage
Award, supra note 2, at 172-73. This circumspection is prompted by both the great variations
injury behavior,see id., and by the inherent limitations in the research methodology. See note
12supra.
18. Since 1974, seven appellate courts and a district court have all decided against informing the jury of trebling. See Heattransfer Corp. v. Volkswagen-werk, A.G., 553 F.2d 964, 989
n.21 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087 (1978); Noble v. McClatchy Newspapers, 533
F.2d 1081, 1090-91 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 433 U.S. 904 (1977); Sulmeyer v.
Coca Cola Co. (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976); Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph
Coors Co., 506 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1975); Embry-Riddle Aeronautical Univ. v. Ross Aviation,
Inc., 504 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1974); Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 500 F.2d 659, 666 (5th Cir.
· 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975); Pollock & RileY. Inc. v. Pearl Brewing Co., 498 F.2d
1240, 1243 (5th Cir. 1974); Overhead Door Corp. v. Nordpal Corp., (1979-1) Trade Cas. ~
62,594 (D. Minn. 1978). See also Amott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873,889 n.15 (8th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 918 (1980) (noting, in dicta, that it would be a "better practice"
not to inform the jury of the trebling provision). Of all these cases, only Noble had a dissenter.
See generally 3 E. DEVITT & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS
§ 90.39 (3d ed. 1977) (the authors no longer recommend informing the jury of trebling because
of the danger of reversal).
Until this recent line of cases, most cases favored informing the jury of trebling. See, e.g.,
cases cited in E. TIMBERLAKE, FEDERAL TREBLE DAMAGE ANTITRUST ACTIONS § 19.06, at
282 n.18 (1965). But see Sabloskey v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 137 F. Supp. 929, 942
(E.D. Pa. 1955); Webster Motor Car Co. v. Packard Motor Car Co., 135 F. Supp. 4, 11 (D.D.C.
1955), revd on other grounds, 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957).
Despite the position taken in recent cases, some courts are still apparently giving an instruction on trebling. See SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ABA, ANTITRUST CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 188 (1980).
19. This assumption is implicit in the holdings. In the leading case, Pollock & Riley Inc. v.
Pearl Brewing Co., 498 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1974), the court stated that the "probable consequence" of an instruction on trebling would be lower awards. 498 F.2d at 1243. This would
only be a "probable consequence" if the jury did not already know of trebling, and so was
confronted with the trebling provision for the first time in the instructio~.
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offset this windfall.20 Although there is no empirical data on the
question, courts and commentators uniformly agree that juries with
this knowledge are likely to reduce awards. 2 I This conclusion finds
some support in Kalven's research, which indicated that juries do
decrease damage verdicts if they feel that the plaintiffs are receiving
windfalls. 22 Interviews with antitrust juries confirm this hypothesis
with persuasive, if scientifically informal, evidence of jury sensitivity
to the trebling provision.23
Despite the judiciary's attempt to prevent this type of manipulation by withholding information about trebling, some juries undoubtedly know that damages will be trebled. Juries may recall the
publicity surrounding cases like MCI Communications Corp. v. ATT,
where the plaintiff won a verdict at trial of $1.8 billion,24 or learn of
trebling during the course of the trial. 25
20. See, e.g., Noble v. McClatchy Newspapers, 533 F.2d 1081, 1090-91 (9th Cir. 1975);
Pollock & Riley, Inc. v. Pearl Brewing Co., 498 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1974).
21. See, e.g., cases cited in note 20supra; Note,Antitrust Law-Jury Instructions on Treble
Damages Held Erroneous, 26 MERCER L. Rev. 1003, 1007 (1975). Even those courts and commentators that advocate informing the jury of trebling generally do not dispute that the jury's
knowledge of trebling will result in lower verdicts. Instead, they argue that the jury already
has this knowledge and hence the likely effect of an instruction will be to prevent misunderstanding. See, e.g., E. TIMBERLAKE, supra note 18, §19.06.
22. Personal Injury Damage Award, supra note 2, at 169.
23. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, June 19, 1980, § D, at 5, col. I (In the jury trial involving MCI
Communications and American Telegraph & Telephone, some of the jurors did not know of
the trebling provision before they returned a 600 million dollar verdict. When the jury foreman learned of trebling after the trial, he said, "I'd feel much better about the whole thing if
they reduced the damages."); Cummings, Anti-trust Administration and Enforcement and the
Attorney General's Committee Report, A General Survey and Critique, 50 Nw. U. L. Rev. 307,
308 (1955) ("A recent poll ofa Philadelphia jury revealed their dismay when they learned that
their already generous antitrust verdict would automatically be trebled.").
24. MCI Commn. Corp. v. ATT, Nos. 80-2171, 80-2288 (7th Cir., Jan. 12, 1983) (available
on LEXIS, Genfed library, Newer file). The jury awarded the plaintiff $600 million and this
amount was then trebled by the court. See E. TIMBERLAKE, supra note 17, § 19.06, at 281
(suggesting that juries "may also learn of trebling from newspapers").
25. See, e.g., Bordonaro Bros. Theatres v. Paramount Pictures, 203 F.2d 616, 678 (2d Cir.
1953). These considerations led the Committee on Trade Regulation and Trade-Marks of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York to conclude that "U)uries can hardly fail to
learn that damages will be trebled under the statute." Committee on Trade Regulation and
Trade-Marks of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Report on H.R. 3408,
reprinted in Discretionary Treble Damages in Private Antitrust Suits: Hearings on H.R. 4597
.Before Subcomm No. 3 ofthe House Committee on the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953) .
.But see note 59 infra and accompanying text
Without empirical evidence, it is very difficult to estimate how frequently juries are aware
of trebling. It is noteworthy, however, that every recent case addressing the issue has implicitly
assumed that juries tend not to be aware of trebling (see cases cited in note 18 supra). Absent
such an assumption, it would make little sense not to provide an instruction on trebling so that
the jury does not misunderstand its role. See E. TIMBERLAKE, supra note 18, § 19.06, at 281-82
("Unless the trebling provision is clearly explained to the jury, basic misunderstandings may
arise which would result in totally erroneous verdicts and judgments. For example, the jury
might itself treble the amount of damages with the effect that plaintiff would recover nine
times the amount of actual damages. Or the jury might divide the amount of damages by
three.").
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Conversely, if a jury does not know of the trebling provision, it is
likely to conform with the general tendency of juries to manipulate
awards upward. 26 This phenomenon seems particularly likely in antitrust cases since defendants are often large corporations. Empirical
data indicate that juries have a strong bias against corporate defendants, 27 a bias appreciated by attomeys28 and by judges.29
Because it is not clear how often juries are aware of trebling, and
because this awareness is likely to determine the direction of jury
manipulation of awards, it is impossible to determine whether the
aggregate effect of such manipulation in antitrust cases is to decrease
or increase awards. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to conclude that in
every antitrust case, a strong possibility exists that the jury's sense of
equity will have a significant impact on its determination of
damages.
B.

The Consequences of Jury Manipulation

How should the courts respond to the probability that juries rely
on extra-legal factors in determining antitrust damage awards?
Many commentators have defended jury manipulation on the
ground that juries should occasionally ignore harsh legal standards
26. Not surprisingly, losing attorneys in antitrust cases have complained about excessive
jury verdicts. One lawyer for American Telephone & Telegraph called the jury's decision to
award MCI Communications 600 million dollars "obscene." Rowley & Knott, $1.8 Billio11
Antitrust Verdict Against AT&T, Chicago Tribune, June 14, 1980, § I, at I. Another attorney
was puzzled by the verdict. He noted that MCI Communications had only claimed 450 million dollars in lost revenue, though the prayer for relief asked for $900 million. N.Y. Times,
June 14, 1980, § I, at I.
27. Broeder found juries biased against corporations on both liability and damage issues.
Juries found corporate defendants liable two percent more often than did judges. On dam•
ages, the jury awarded 25% more against corporate defendants than the judge would have
awarded. Broeder, supra note 12, at 750-51.
One explanation for this may be that juries "adjust their awards according to the defendants ability to pay." Id. at 751. Corporations, like state or city governments, are "deep
pockets" - juries believe the defendants are not really hurt by a large award to the plaintiff.
Broeder points out that judges and juries are much closer on damages when the defendant is
an individual. Id. at 750. See also Personal Injury Pamage Award, supra note 2, at 171 (effect
of insurance on the size of awards). Another possible explanation could be general bias against
corporations. Harold Levy, former general counsel of American Telephone & Telegraph, asserts that juries tend to show an "affinity for the little guy" ·in big business cases. See Sylvester,
Jury's Still Out on Jury Trials, Natl. L.J., March 1, 1982, at 1, col. I.
28. At the July, 1981 convention of the American Trial Lawyers Association, delegates
were coached to "seethe with rage at a corporate defendant's villainy." N.Y. Times, July 28,
1981, § D, at 20, col. I.
29. Judges believe this bias is so pervasive that a special cautionary instruction is required.
Devitt & Blackmar, in their set of recommended jury instructions, include a standard instruction for use in all federal civil trials with a corporate defendant. The instruction cautions the
jury that "[a] corporation is entitled to the same fair trial at your hands as a private individual." 3 E. DEVITT & C. BLACKMAR supra note 18, § 71.05. See SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW,
ABA, ANTITRUST CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 138-40 (1972); R. MCBRIDE, THE ART OF IN·
STRUCTING THE JURY § 4.37 (1968).
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and reach verdicts based on community norms of justice.30 But
whatever the validity of this argument in other situations, it has little
merit in the context of private treble damage actions. The private
cause of action for antitrust violations exists solely by force of legislation, and jury manipulation in such cases offends both the statutory provision creating the cause of action and the policies behind it.
1. Statutory Analysis

"[T]he starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of
the statute itself." 31 Section 4 of the Clayton Act entitles the successful private plaintiff to recover "threefold the damages by him sustained."32 This language suggests that the financial value of the
plaintiff's actual losses is the amount to be trebled; the statute refers
to the damages "sustained" by the plaintiff rathe! than those perceived by the jury. Admittedly, antitrust damages frequently defy
precise calculation, and juries often can assess damages only approximately. 33 The jury's value in estimating uncertain damages, however, goes only to the determination of damages actually
"sustained," and not to any normative adjustment of those damages
according to the jury's sense of equity.
The purposes of the trebling provision support such an interpretation. The private damage action serves both as a remedy and as a
deterrent, compensating the victim and protecting the public by punishing the offender.34 These objectives frequently conflict, for damages in excess of actual losses impose on the defendant a penalty
deliberately disproportionate to the harm caused by his wrongdoing,
which accrues to the plaintiff as a windfall. 35 The trebling provision,
however mechanically, resolves this conflict between fairness and
30. See note 3 supra.
31. Consumer Prod. Safety Commn. v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). See note 5 supra.
33. See, e.g., Zenith Corp. v. Hazeltine, 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969) (the "damage issues in
these cases are rarely susceptible of the kind of concrete, detailed proof of injury which is
available in other contexts."); Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946)
("the jury may make a just and reasonable estimate of the damage based on relevant data, and
render its verdict accordingly. In such circumstances, 'juries are allowed to act upon probable
and inferential, as well as direct and positive proof.'") (citations omitted); Story Parchment
Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 561-64 (1931); Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 377-79 (1927).
34. Pfizer, Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308,314 (1978) (''The Court has noted that§ 4 has two
purposes: to deter violators and deprive them of 'the fruits of their illegality,' and 'to compensate victims of antitrust violations for their injuries.'") (citations omitted); Fortner Enterprises
v. United States Steel, 394 U.S. 495, 502 (1969) ("As the special provision awarding treble
damages to successful plaintiffs illustrates, Congress has encouraged private antitrust litigation
not merely to compensate those who have been directly injured but also to vindicate the important public interest in free competition.").
35. Since punishment cannot deter unless the penalties imposed for violations exceed their
rewards, conflict between deterrence and compensation is inevitable. Deterrent punishment
makes "a defendant suffer not for what he only has done but because of other people's tenden-
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utility by fixing damages at a multiple of the plaintiffs losses. 36 Since
Congress has already weighed the wrongfulness of the defendant's
conduct and the need for deterrence against the principle of compensatory justice, the statute leaves no room for further equitable tinkering according to the conscience of the jury.37 The jury's function in a
civil antitrust case, then, is to determine as a factual matter the
amount of plaintiffs losses; the statutory trebling provision then determines, as a normative matter, the amount of plaintiffs judgment.
cies." United States v. Alton Box Board Co., (1977) Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 61,336, at 71,166
(N.D. Ill.).
This tension surfaces repeatedly in Supreme Court decisions; the Court often appears to
emphasize one statutory purpose over another depending on the result to be reached. Compare Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485 (1977) ("Section 4, in
contrast, is in essence a remedial provision. . . . Of course, treble damages also play an important role in penalizing wrongdoers and deterring wrongdoing, as we also have frequently observed."), with Perma Life Mufflers v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968)
("The plaintiff who reaps the rewards of treble damages may be no less morally reprehensible
than the defendant, but the law encourages his suit to further the overriding public policy in
favor of competition.").
36. As Judge Wood noted at the outset of his MCI opinion:
If there is any inclination, however, to generally find fault with the impressive verdict, I
would shift a good share of the blame on to the law itself. There is necessarily permitted
in antitrust cases some laxity in the computation of damages, as we shall discuss. A just
and reasonable "estimate," based upon relevant data, will suffice although it must be short
of speculation or guess work. After a jury, with that practical computation leeway, has
conscientiously rendered a verdict which presumably the jury believes will fully compensate the plaintiff for its damages, the statute then takes over [and] multiplies that verdict
by three. . . . In my judgment the trebling requirement deserves Congressional review. . . . But, in any event, we have to try to resolve this case as we now find the law
and the evidence.
MCI Commn. v. ATT, Nos. 80-2171, 80-2288 (7th Cir., Jan. 12, 1983) (available on LEXIS,
Genfed library, Newer file) (separate opinion of Wood, J.) at n.1.
Congress could have decided that a multiplier lower or higher than three would provide
the proper balance between these competing policies. Although the legislative history behind
the treble damage provision is scant, it is clear that there was at least some consideration of
single or double damages. Bernard, On Judgments and Settlements in Antitrust Litigations:
When Should.Damages he Trebles?, 56 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1, 1 n.l (1981). Moreover, Congress
has on a number of occasions rejected, or refused to act on, proposals to modify either the
multiplier or to make the treble damage award discretionary. See note 48 supra.
Justices of the Supreme Court have noted the extraordinary nature of this remedy,see, e.g.,
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 442-43 & n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (contrasting the "massive" liability under trebling with financial penalties imposed by
other Federal laws); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 615 (Stewart, J., dissenting),
while also observing that Congress has refused to adjust this resolution of the competing concerns. See 435 U.S. at 443 & n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); 428 U.S. at 599 n.39 (per Stevens,
J.). Similarly, commentators have noted the special attributes of a recovery set above the level
of actual damages. See, e.g., K. ELZINGA &
BREIT, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES: A STUDY
IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 84-96 (1976); Note, Antitrust Treble .Damages as Applied to Local
Govemment Entities: .Does the Punishment Fit the .Defendant?, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 411, 414.
37. See Note,sup,:a note 21, at 1007. See also Parker, Treble .Damage Action-A Financial
.Deterrent lo Antitrust Violations?, 16 ANTITRUST BULL. 483, 501 (1971); Study of Monopoly
Power: Hearings Before Subcomm. on Study ofMonopoly Power ofthe House Committee on the
Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 295 (1949) (testimony of Walton Hamilton). Courts have consistently recognized that the function of juries in antitrust cases is to determine the amount of
damages and not the sum that the plaintiff will actually receive. See, e.g., Pollock & Riley,
Inc. v. Pearl Brewing Co., 498 F.2d 1240, 1243 (5th Cir. 1974); Semke v. Enid Automobile
Dealers Assoc., 456 F.2d 1361, 1370 (10th Cir. 1972).

w.
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The anomalies that would result from permitting jury manipulation support the conclusion that the statutory trebling provision
preempts the jury's normative functions in determining antitrust
damages. As indicated earlier, a key factor affecting the jury's sense
of equity in antitrust cases is whether the jury knows that the court
will treble its damage award. The presence or absence of such
knowledge is, however, largely fortuitous from the standpoint of the
opposing parties;38 it certainly bears no relevance to the merits or
equities of a particular case. Allowing juries to manipulate awards
when juries do not uniformly know of trebling39 would, therefore,
lead to extremely inequitable results.40
A second type of anomaly occurs in cases in which the jury is
unaware of trebling. The notion that jury manipulation will result in
a more just award depends on the assumption that the damages
awarded by the jury will be the amount actually awarded; this is the
amount that the jury has deemed an equitable result. Trebling this
amount, however, abandons the jury's estimation of an equitable result - in fact, the jury would consider the amount awarded extremely inequitable. Moreover, in those cases where juries are
unaware of trebling, there is no possibility that the jury will avoid
this result by offsetting the trebling provision. Trebling by its very
nature thus supersedes the traditional approval of adjusting damages
according to the jury's sense of equity.
These incongruities between the achievement of the jury's notions of equity and the treble damage provision suggest that private
antitrust suits are intended to further more important goals than jury
equity. Indeed, the Supreme Court expressly recognized the
subordinate value of achieving an equitable result in Perma L!fe
38. Since juries are typically not informed about trebling during the trial, their awareness
of this fact will usually depend on their knowledge prior to the trial. The litigators may, however, be able to exercise some control over whether the jury is aware of trebling through jury
selection or trial conduct. See Bordonaro Bros. Theatres v. Paramount Pictures, 203 F.2d 676,
678 (2d Cir. 1953).
39. One should not necessarily conclude from this discussion that courts should begin to
inform juries of trebling. Even if one is willing to assume, as few courts have, that most juries
are already aware of trebling, it seems likely that at least a significant number do not have this
knowledge. To the extent that these juries lower verdicts as a result of trebling, the deterrent
effect of private antitrust actions is diminished. See Note,supra note 21, at 1007 ("if informing
the jury of the treble-damages provision of the Clayton Act could even potentially result in a
reduced verdict, then the statutory purpose would be hampered and the instruction should not
be allowed.").
40. An illustration should make this inequity clear. Consider an antitrust case with Jury A,
where Jury A is aware of the trebling provision. If Jury A decided for the plaintiff, its awareness of the provision is likely to lead it to award less than actual damages. See notes 21-22
supra and accompanying text. However, if a case with identical facts is tried before Jury B,
which is unaware of trebling, Jury B is likely to award significantly more than actual damages.
See notes 26-29 supra and accompanying text. Hence, although the facts of the cases, and
consequently the relative equities of the cases, are exactly the same, jury manipulation has led
to dramatically different results.
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MujJlers v. International Parts Corporation. 41 In arguing that in pari
delicto should not be a defense in private antitrust suits, four justices,
in a plurality opinion, stated:
The plaintiff who reaps the rewards of treble damages may be no less
morally reprehensible than the defendant, but the law encourages his
suit to further the overriding public policy in favor of competition. A
more fastidious regard for the relative moral worth of the parties
would only result in seriously undermining the usefulness of the private action as a bulwark of antitrust enforcement.42
Of course, it does not matter whether a particular result is higher or
lower than that contemplated by the trebling provision; the point is
that in antitrust cases, the statute itself fulfills the functions typically
discharged by the jury in setting the damages in other types of civil
cases.43
Thus, as a matter of legal method, quite independent of policy
concerns, it follows that jury manipulation contravenes the statutory
basis of the plaintiffs cause of action. Whether the jury distorts the
damage award in favor of the plaintiff or the defendant, manipulation of damages frustrates the congressional intention animating the
treble damages provision. Consequently, the courts should do all
they can to maximize the jury's fidelity to the statutory damage
formula.

2. Policy Analysis
Jury manipulation not only offends the statutory treble damages
provision; it also threatens important policies served by the antitrust
laws. Too low an award, arrived at in anticipation of statutory trebling, undercuts the deterrent effect of private actions. On the other
hand, too high an award stemming from antipathy to the corporate
defendant has the opposite effect: potential but innocent defendants
may forego legitimate and productive economic behavior, and po41. ~92 U.S. 134 (1968).
42. 392 U.S. at 139. These four justices clearly believed that equity is a subordinate goal in
private antitrust actions. Justice White's concurrence argued that in pari de/icto should be a
defense in some circumstances, but he took this position because of the deterrence policy underlying antitrust actions and not because of equitable considerations. 392 U.S. at 145-46
(White, J., concurring). Justice Fortas also argued that in pari de/icto could be a defense,
Whether he based this on deterrent grounds or on equitable considerations is not clear from
his opinion. 392 U.S. at 147-48 (Fortas, J., concurring). Justice Marshall's concurrence argued
that deterrence and equitable considerations dictate allowing in pari de/icto as a defense, but he
recognized that in some circumstances the public policies advanced by the antitrust laws may
override equitable considerations. 392 U.S. at 151 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Harlan,
in an opinion joined by Justice Stewart, indicated that equitable considerations justify recognition of in pari de/icto as a defense. 392 U.S. at 154 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The case suggests that at least five of the justices believed that the deterrent policy
advanced by private antitrust actions is significantly more important than the achievement of
an equitable result. See generally Note, Plaintiff's Misconduct as a Defense in Private Antitrust
Actions, ll MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 382 (1981).
43. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
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tential plaintiffs with colorable but meritless claims may bring nuisance suits, lured by the prospect of extorting a settlement from a
defendant fearful of going to the jury.
Jury manipulation may undercut the policies advanced by the
treble damages provision. The provision is intended to facilitate enforcement of the antitrust laws in two ways. First, by increasing
plaintiffs' recoveries, trebling encourages antitrust suits and thus enlists private plaintiffs in the enforcement of the antitrust laws.44 This
financial incentive to bring suit is especially important given the difficulty and expense of litigating private antitrust suits.45 Second, by
imposing a harsh penalty for violations of the antitrust laws, trebling
deters such transgressions.46 Congress has twice passed legislation to
ensure the forceful implementation of these policies47 and has consistently rejected proposals to weaken the trebling provision.48 Jury
manipulation resulting in a smaller award frustrates these policies,
because lower awards diminish both the incentive to bring suit and
the ·penalty on the wrongdoer.
Correspondingly, jury manipulation resulting in larger awards,
due to juries' antipathy toward large corporations, aggravates certain
negative policy consequences of the treble damages provision. Because of large potential recoveries, trebling creates an incentive to
bring harassment suits.49 The possibility of such suits, and the dangers incurred when business conduct falls within the gray areas of
44. E.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 486 n.10 (1977);
United States v. Borden Co., 347 U.S. 514, 518 (1954).
45. E.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 486 n.10 (1977)
(quoting Sen. Sherman, sponsor of the Sherman Act, on the difficulty of maintaining antitrust
suits).
46. E.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308, 314-15 (1978); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo
Bowl-0-Mat, Inc. 429 U.S. 477, 485 (1977).
.
47. In 1980, Congress granted trial judges the discretion to award plaintiffs interest on their
actual damages in addition. See note 5 supra. Though the primary purpose of this amendment was to punish delaying tactics rather than to compensate plaintiffs, see 126 CONG. REc.
H8047-48 (daily ed. Aug. 28, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Mazzoli), this amendment does indicate
congressional support for vigorous, undelayed use of the treble damage provision.
Additionally, the compensatory portion of the plaintiff's recovery is exempted from taxes in
some circumstances. The plaintiff will pay no taxes on the compensatory portion when he
received no tax benefit on the loss caused by the antitrust violation. I.R.C. § 186.
The Supreme Court has also accorded generous treatment to private plaintiffs because of
these policy goals. The Court allows plaintiffs to recover even where the proof of the amount
of damages is not concrete or detailed. In Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395
U.S. 100 (1969), the Court stated that the lower courts must observe "the practical limits of the
burden of proof which may be demanded of the antitrust plaintiff. . . damage issues in these
cases are rarely susceptible of the kind of concrete, detailed proof of injury which is available
in other contexts." 395 U.S. at 123. The Court requires, however, that the plaintiff show he
suffered some injury before these liberal rules as to the amount of injury apply. See note 6
supra.
48. Efforts to have the treble damage award reduced or eliminated were unsuccessful in
1898 and 1908. Attempts to give courts discretion to reduce the damage award below the
trebled amount were unsuccessful in 1953, 1955, 1957, 1959, and 1961. K. ELZINGA & W.
BREIT, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES: A STUDY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 64-65 (1976).
49. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 6, at § 331; Breit & Elzinga, Antitrust £'!force-
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antitrust law, 50 may deter some socially valuable competitive activity. 51 This risk of "overdeterrence" is exacerbated when jury manipulation increases the potential liability of defendants. 52 Finally,
courts sometimes hesitate to expand the law to encompass new anticompetitive practices. 53 Fear of the enormous verdicts that may
result from jury manipulation may further entrench this cautious
attitude.
In short, jury manipulation of antitrust awards furthers neither
the purposes advanced by defenders of jury discretion nor the purposes of the antitrust laws. To the contrary, such manipulation is
very likely to lead to results that are both inequitable and, in terms
of antitrust policy, unwise.54
II.

CONTROLLING JURY MANIPULATION

This Part reviews current precautions against jury manipulation,
and then presents two proposals designed more effectively to minimize manipulation in private antitrust suits. These proposals attempt
to reduce the incidence of manipulation by changing the way the
jury undertakes its function and by rendering jury manipulation
more susceptible to appellate review. Given the obstacles to more
ambitious reforms, these proposals offer the most realistic means of
controlling jury manipulation.
men/ and Economic Efficiency, 17 J.L. & EcoN. 329, 340-44 (1974) (authors note that "nuisance
suit" incentives are compounded by the unpredictability of jury verdicts).
50. See Comment,Antitrust Enforcement by Private Parties: Analysis ofl)evelopments in t/1e
Treble l)amage Suit, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1061 n.334 (1962).
51. See Elzinga in Panel l)iscussion: Private Actions - The Purposes Sought and t/1e Results Achieved, 43 ANTITRUST L.J. 73, 99 (1973) (arguing that antitrust suits based on predatory behavior may result in "a lessening of price competition, additional price rigidity, and a
greater propensity for companies to use non-price avenues of competition, such as advertising
and frivolous product differentiation.").
52. Even if jury manipulation does not increase the average recovery in private antitrust
actions (because upward and downward manipulation of awards may offset each other), it
should increase the likelihood of extremely large verdicts. By either increasing or decreasing
awards, manipulation pushes verdicts away from the norm and toward extreme results. In
considering whether to undertake activity that may lead to an antitrust suit, it is possible that
corporations are more deterred by the low risk of an extremely large verdict than the more
likely risk of a moderate verdict. See Breit & Elzinga,Antitrust Penalties and Altitudes Toward
Risk: An Economic Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 693, 705-06 (1973) (arguing that modern busi•
nesses tend to be risk avoiders, and "that a risk adverse management is more likely to be
deterred by high financial penalties than by a high probability of detection and conviction with
accompanying penalties not severe.").
53. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 6, at§ 331.
54. Achieving a proper balance in antitrust cases between the competing policies "is clearly
a difficult if not impossible task." Parker, The l)eterrent Effect ofPrivate Treble l)amage Suits:
Fact or Fantasy, 3 N.M. L. REV. 286, 292 (1973). Congress is in a far superior position to
investigate and balance these competing policies than is a jury that has neither expertise nor
investigative capacity.
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Current Efforts To Minimize Jury Manipulation

The courts currently rely on two procedures to avoid jury manipulation of antitrust damage awards. First, recent authority uniformly disfavors informing the jury of the trebling rule. Second,
trial judges typically admonish the jury with general instructions on
the nature of damages and the need to treat corporate defendants
fairly. While fully justified, neither procedure offers an adequate response to the manipulation problem.
Although some division of authority exists,55 current authority
unanimously rejects informing the jury of the trebling provision. 56
The reason for this approach is the apprehension that juries aware of
the trebling rule will reduce damages accordingly, frustrating the deterrent purposes of the statute. 57 The older, contrary authority reasoned from the premise that the jury would learn of the trebling
provision in the course of the trial, requiring an instruction on trebling to avoid confusion.58 The more recent opinions have the better
argument, for three reasons. First, given a proper pretrial motion by
plaintiff's counsel and appropriate rules of court, the trial can proceed without betraying the treble damage requirement.59 Second,
the court can adopt a cautionary instruction to clarify the jury's role
in assessing damages without discussing trebling. 6° Finally, given
the overriding importance accorded the deterrent function of the
treble damages provision, the risk of the jury reducing damages outweighs the risks associated with jury uncertainty.61 Since informing
the jury of the trebling provision does not advance any independent
55. See note 18 supra for a summary of the conflicting authorities.
56. Since 1974, seven appellate decisions have approved not informing the jury of trebling;
only one judge dissented from this result. See note 18 supra.
57. This assumption is implicit in the holdings. See note 19 supra.
58. See Bordonaro Bros. Theatres v. Paramount Pictures, 203 F.2d 676, 678-79 (2d Cir.
1953) ("Such a statement is more desirable than a half-recital, with attempted concealment of
a part - a method leading inevitably to an overemphasis of an otherwise not significant
detail.").
59. There appears to be no inherent barrier to conducting the trial so as to avoid references
to treble damages; the trial court can grant a plaintiffs motion in limine to forbid discussion of
the trebling provision, and references in the pleadings to trebling can be excised if the court
rules call for reading the pleadings to the jury. See generally Pollock & Riley, Inc. v. Pearl
Brewing Co., 362 F. Supp. 335, 337-38 (W.D. Tex. 1973), qffd., 498 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1974)
(rules of this district court permit conduct of trial without disclosing pleadings or statutory
damage provision to jury). The motion in limine should be made before voir dire to avoid any
prejudicial questions during jury selection. See 498 F.2d at 1242.
60. "Our immediate reaction [to the confusion argument] is that a district court can sufficiently instruct the jury to determine only actual damages. In those cases where an accidental
revelation occurs, the court can give curative instruction to alleviate confusion." Pollock &
Riley, Inc. v. Pearl Brewing Co., 498 F.2d 1240, 1243 (5th Cir. 1974).
61. See Semke v. Enic Automobile Dealers Assn., 456 F.2d 1361, 1370 (10th Cir. 1972)
("The consequences of advising the jury of this can only be that the jury will adjust its award
accordingly. . . . therefore, it serves no useful function to communicate this information to
the jury and it is potentially harmful, and hence [instructing the jury on trebling] was error.").
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policy, trial courts should rely on the more recent authority and attempt to prevent the jury from learning, from the trial or from instructions, that the court will treble the jury's estimate of damages. 62
But this refusal to inform the jury of trebling will do no more
than help reduce some types of jury manipulation. Avoiding any
discussion of treble damages prevents a jury unaware of trebling
from lowering its award, because the jury never perceives a windfall
to the plaintiff. 63 To ensure accurate damage determinations, however, courts must prevent two further possiblities of manipulation.
First, juries may impose their own punitive sanctions on defendants.
Second, some juries may know of trebling independently of the trial,
and decrease the award accordingly.
The second procedure currently relied on to discourage manipulation, i.e., cautionary instructions, may somewhat, but not completely, alleviate these concerns. Courts typically instruct juries to
treat corporate litigants fairly. 64 These instructions, however, have
not quelled the widely acknowledged bias against corporate defendants, and to the extent these instructions alert the jury to the corporate "deep pocket," they aggravate rather than mitigate the
problem. 65 The judge also typically instructs the jury to award only
compensatory damages, to "put the plaintiff in as good a position as
if the . . . violation had not occurred."66 But judges give such in62. Even the courts which have approved of instructing the jury on trebling have not held
it error to do otherwise. Thus, district courts in circuits where the older opinions prevail
should exercise their discretion and follow the contemporary approach of not infonmng the
jury of trebling, and of conducting antitrust trials so as to avoid references to treble damages.
63. The present assumption that juries are unaware of trebling seems plausible. All courts
deciding the issue in the past eight years have come to this conclusion. See note 18 supra.
Perhaps most persuasive, plaintiffs apparently believe juries do not know of trebling. If plaintiffs thought juries did know of trebling, they would desire an instruction explaining the purposes of trebling to offset the perception of a windfall.
64. See note 29 supra.
65. Kalven has noted that cautionary instructions can sensitize a jury to an issue. Using
mock juries, he found that instructing the jury to disregard insurance actually raised awards.
Personal Injury Damage Award, supra note 2, at 163; Kalven, A Report on the Jury Project of
the University of Chicago Law School, 24 INS. COUNSEL J. 368, 377-78 (1957). Similarly, an
instruction to treat a corporation fairly might emphasize the "deep pocket" of the corporate
defendant. See generally note 27 supra.
66. See, e.g, cases cited in SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 18, at 170-72. A typical instruction where the plaintiff alleges a conspiracy is: "The purpose of awarding damages
in a private antitrust case is to put the plaintiff in as good a position as if the conspiracy had
not occurred." Reno-West Coast Distrib. Co. v. The Mead Corp., 613 F.2d 722 (9th Cir. 1979).
The cautionary instruction given at trial in MCI Commn. Corp. v. ATT, Nos. 80-2171, 802288 (7th Cir., Jan. 12, 1983) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Newer file), admonished
only that "Any damages you do award must have a reasonable basis in the evidence and
cannot be based upon speculation, guess or conjecture." Appendix, jury instruction 54.
Whether the jury increased the damage award in the case because of perceived inequity, and
whether an instruction reserving questions o( equity to the court would have countered this
tendency, are of course unanswerable questions. What is clear is that the jury arrived at a
reversibly excessive damage award despite a conventional cautionary instruction.
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structions in most civil cases, and juries nevertheless manipulate
damage awards. 67 Given that these instructions have not succeeded
in eliminating jury manipulation in other civil cases, it seems doubtful that they can do so in the special context of antitrust suits. Consequently, the courts should consider additional measures to
encourage accurate damage assessments in treble damage actions.
B. New Procedures for Reducing Jury Manipulation

The courts might take advantage of several possibilities for further curtailing jury manipulation of damages in antitrust cases.
Some of the options, both traditional68 and radical, 69 reject the very
idea of jury determination of damages. The seventh amendment
poses a serious obstacle to such approaches. Moreover, properly
guided, the jury performs a valuable function in estimating real but
uncertain damages.7° Consequently, this Note proposes two re61. See notes 14-17 supra and accompanying text.
68. The most direct response to perceived jury manipulation is the remittitur, by which the
trial judge orders a new trial unless the plaintiff consents to a lower damage award set by the
judge. The device, however, is of limited utility in the antitrust context. The determination of
antitrust damages is often highly uncertain. See note 33 supra and accompanying text. This
uncertainty restricts the use of the remittitur in two ways. First, as a threshold matter, most
courts require that the damages be clearly excessive as a matter of law. See, e.g., Brents v.
Freeman's Oil Field Serv., Inc., 448 F.2d 601 (5th Cir. 1971); Collum v. Butler, 288 F. Supp.
918 (N.D. ill. 1968), qffd, 421 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1970). Quite aside from any policy preference for jury determinations in cases of uncertainty, a clear showing of excessive damages may
be impossible. Second, even where a remittitur is ordered, the judge may still set the damages
at the highest level not clearly erroneous; while there is some dissent as to where the court has
the authority to fix the remittitur amount, "[t]his is the only theory that has any reasonable
claim of being consistent with the Seventh Amendment." 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 2815 at 104-05 (1973). Setting damages at the highest level
permitted by uncertain evidence, to be trebled subsequently, does little to reduce the problem.
An additional problem is that plaintiffs may elect a new trial (particularly if limited to damages only), resulting in a certain waste ofjudicial resources and a repeated risk ofjury manipulation in the second trial. And where knowledge of trebling leads to a reduced award, no
direct tampering with the verdict is possible, because the federal courts do not permit the
practice of additur. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486-87 (1935).
69. The issue of whether the risks of jury decisions in complex cases so jeopardize the due
process interests of defendants as to override the seventh amendment's guarantee of the right
to jury trial in civil cases is beyond the scope of this Note. Compare In re United States Fin.
Sec. Litigation, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub. nom, Grant v. Union Bank, 446
U.S. 929 (1980), w1~h In re Japanese Electronic Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d
Cir. 1980). For an analysis of the uncertainties involved in this isssue,see Lempert, Civil Juries
and Complex Cases: Let's Not Rush to Judgment, 80 MICH. L. REV. 68 (1981). For a summary
of the literature on the subject, see id at 69 n.3. For the purposes of this Note, it suffices to
observe that abolishing jury trials for civil antitrust cases remains an approach fraught with
constitutional doubts, particularly where the jury manipulation complained of involves precisely the sort ofjury value judgments which inspired the seventh amendment, rather than any
inability to comprehend the technical issues admittedly presented in many antitrust cases.
70. This, of course, is one of the reasons for relying on juries in the first place. Judge
Wright, in defending the strict standard of review applied to trial court decisions to uphold
jury awards, voiced the received wisdom by acknowledging "the deference properly given to
the jury's determination of such matters of fact as the weight of the evidence and the quantum
of damages," a deference "further weighted by the constitutional allocation to the jury of ques-
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forms intended to minimize manipulation without disturbing the important role of the jury in deciding civil lawsuits.
I. Proposed Jury Instruction

Many courts already give juries instructions intended to discourage jury manipulation. Courts often instruct juries to treat corporate
defendants fairly71 and, in treble damage actions, to award only
compensatory damages.72 Both types of instructions are given as admonitions: the jury is told what or what not to do.
Such instructions do have some influence. Since jurors perceive
judges as authority figures, they feel some pressure to follow the
judges' instruction.73 Clearly, however, these instructions are not totally effective at controlling juries: manipulation continues despite
such instruction.74 Furthermore, because the instructions concerning
corporate defendants may sensitize a jury to the corporate "deep
pocket," such instructions may prove counterproductive.75
A growing number of researchers have adopted a sociological
theory that helps explain jury manipulation and the limitations of
admonishing instructions.76 This theory, termed "equity theory," 77
tions of fact." Taylor v. Washington Terminal Co., 409 F.2d 145, 148 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 835 (1969).
71. See note 29 supra.
72. See note 83 infra.
73. Juries are influenced by the judge. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 1, at 42627 (in criminal cases where the evidence clearly favors one side, judges virtually eliminate jury
manipulation if they exercise the power to comment on the evidence). The judge, as an
authority figure, might be successful in persuading jurors to ignore their evaluations of equity
in favor of the law. See Note, Toward Principles of Jury Equity, 83 YALE L.J. 1023, 1049-50
(1974).
Subjects in social psychology experiments have been willing to trust the value judgments
and perceptions of authority figures. Milgram, in one famous experiment, persuaded his subjects to continue administering increasingly large electric shocks even after the ''victims" of the
shocks cried out in pain. 62% of the subjects continued to administer the shocks when instructed to do so. The "victims" were accomplices of Milgram in the experiment. See Milgram, Some Conditions of Obedience and .Disobedience lo Authority, 18 HUMAN REL, 57 (1965).
The legal analogy to this obedience is that the jury does not often openly disobey the judge.
See note 85 infra and accompanying text.
74. Despite the fact that juries are typically instructed on awarding actual damages, manipulation is common. See notes 14-17 supra and accompanying text. The limitations of such
instructions are clearly recognized by judges who refuse to inform juries of trebling, since such
judges implicitly reject the alternative of providing such information and instructing the jury
to provide full compensatory damages. See generally note 18 supra.
75. See note 65 supra and accompanying text.
16. See E. WALSTER, G. WALSTER & E. BERSCHIED, EQUITY 64-81 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as EQUITY]; lzzet & Sales, supra note 16. Izzet and Sales have concluded that equity
theory is more consistent with the data on jury behavior than other proposed explanations of
jury behavior.
77. Homans first developed this theory as a "rule of distributive justice." G. HOMANS,
SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 74-75 (1961). He advanced equity theory as the grand design overarching
the discrete theories of sociology. See id. at 10-12. Waister, Waister and Berschied also advance equity theory as the all-encompassing construct of sociology. See EQUITY, supra note
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posits that people consider a relationship equitable when both parties to the relationship receive outcomes proportionate to their investments.78 A participant in an inequitable relationship will feel
distressed79 and will have a psychological need to correct the inequity.80 Researchers have found that observers of an inequitable relationship react similarly to participants 81 and consequently will
attempt to remedy the inequity. Jurors are observers of the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant, and like other observers,
feel a real psychological need to restore equity to inequitable situations. 82 If a jury thinks legal remedies alone, such as compensatory
damages, will fail to rectify any inequities, the jury will strive to remedy the situation through its decision on liability and damages. 83
The cautionary instructions, though somewhat effective because
of the judge's authority, do not satisfy this psychological need. The
76, at 1-2. For the purposes of this Note, equity theory is only used to explain the behavior of
juries, not the entire sociological universe.
Adams is the other early developer of equity theory. In Adams, Inequity in Social Ex-·
change, in 2 ADVANCES lN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 267 (L. Berkowitz ed. 1965),
he presented a more sophisticated version of the theory, emphasizing the reactions of people to
"inequitable relationships."
Both Homans and Adams used equity theory to explain industrial relations problems. Because of the abundance of empirical and experimental research in this area, the field has become a prime testing ground for equity theorists. See EQUITY, supra note 76, at 114-41 (review
of research in this area, indicating the consistency of equity theory with actual behavior).
18. See Izzet & Sales, supra note 16, at 211-13; Waister, Berschied, & Waister, New .Directions in Equity Research, 25 J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCH. 151, 151-53 (1973).
More rigorously, equity theory explains how observers to a relationship react to that relationship. The theory presumes that people wish to maximize the outcome from any given
relationship. It does not presume that people are altruistic. The outcome of a relationship
consists of the ratio of rewards to costs (rewards being those satisfying results such as health,
happiness, increased wages or an interesting job; costs, such as losing a job, are the frustrating
obstacles to psychological and emotional satisfaction). Individuals maximize their outcomes,
however, within an accepted set of societal norms which allocate rewards and costs. See Izzet
& Sales, supra note 16, at 212-13; Waister, Berschied & Waister, supra at 151-53.
An equitable relationship can be expressed by the equation:

R1 =R2
C1 =C2
where R1 and R2 signify the rewards of the two people, and C1 and C2 signify the costs.
Each reward and cost can be broken down into inputs and outputs, but this level of sophistication is not required here. See Izzet & Sales, supra note 16, at 212.
79. The Walsters and Berschied call the research evidence of this distress "compelling."
EQUITY, supra note 76, at 17. What is particularly convincing is that even the beneficiaries of
an inequitable relationship, the "exploiters" of the relationship, feel "distressed" by the inequity. Id. at 17-18, 22-44.
80. EQUITY, supra note 76, at 18.
81. lzzet & Sales, supra note 16, at 214. See Baker, Experimental Analysis of Third Party
Behavior, 30 J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCH. 307, 315 (1974).
82. Izzet and Sales note the similarity in how observers are used in psychological personal
perception studies, and the manner in which jurors are used to evaluate the litigants. Both the
observers and jurors are neutral third parties who react to the inequities in the relationship
before them. lzzet & Sales, supra note 18, at 214-15.
83. When a jury manipulates its damage award to reflect the equities, it is reallocating the
costs and rewards of the relationship in an attempt to restore equity. See id. at 215.
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instructions create a tension between the desire to obey the judge
and the need to restore equity to inequitable situations. 84 While a
jury might not consciously disregard the judge, Kalven and Zeisel's
research indicates that when cases are close and evidence is indecisive, the jury "yields to sentiment in the apparent process of resolving doubts as to evidence." 85
To reduce the likelihood of jury manipulation, an instruction
must recognize and address the jury's need to restore equity. 86 The
instruction proposed here is intended to convince the jury that the
judge will remedy any perceived inequities. Under the proposed instruction, the judge does not say that factors such as intent, culpability and motive are irrelevant; he instead reserves these questions for
himself. Specifically, courts should instruct the jury:
If you find for the plaintiff in accordance with these instructions, it
then becomes your responsibility to determine the actual economic
damages which the plaintiff has suffered. You are only to concern
yourself with determing actual damages.
I realize that over the course of the trial you may have developed
strong personal feelings about the parties or their conduct. The jury,
however, is a fact-finder. You should reach your decision on the facts
and not on the basis of your emotions. Questions of fairness and punishment are for the court and the court has and will take these into
account in renderingjudgment.87
This instruction minimizes the jury's psychological need to manipulate the damage award by advising the jury that its equitable concerns will be addressed. Instead of creating tensions between the
tendency to obey the judge and the need to restore equity, the in84. The tendency to follow the judge, see note 73 supra and accompanying text, can be
included in the equity equation. Because of the strong moral pressure to obey the judge, emphasized by the decorum and solemnity of the courtroom, there is a psychological cost to the
jurors in restoring equity in disobedience of instructions.
85. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note I, at 165 (criminal cases). See Personal Injury
.Damage Award, supra note 2, at 172 (civil cases) ("[T]he jury's special equities are likely to
come into play only where there is a gap or ambiguity in the facts, where that is the controversy ~ic] is close to indeterminate. Then the jury may utilize the freedom created by the
doubt to add some equities the law ignores.").
86. Because of the subtle influence of bias, more strident admonishing instructions would
probably not eliminate jury manipulation. In close cases, the jury could still impose its value
judgments with the belief that it was resolving difficult issues of facL
87. It might seem somewhat deceptive to tell the jury that adjustments of the award are
"questions for the court" when in fact trebling is mandatory. One court, however, approved a
similiarly deceptive instruction precisely because it hides the mandatory nature of the adjust•
ment. Standard Indus., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 475 F.2d 220, 223-24 (10th Cir.), cerl. denied,
414 U.S. 829 (1973). This deceptive language seems desirable for the same reason that juries
are not informed of trebling; if the jury knows the court has to make some adjustments, it may
not believe the final result will be equitable and hence may manipulate its award.
This instruction avoids another potential problem. Juries are given wide latitude in deter•
mining damages in antitrust suits. See note 6 supra. An overemphasis on actual damages in
the instructions might tend to cut back on this latitude. This proposed instruction, however,
only restricts the jury's latitude in assessing awards based on noneconomic considerations. It
does not restrict the jury's freedom in computing awards on the basis of economic loss.
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struction should assure jurors that obeying instructions will result in
a fair and equitable conclusion. The jury will then be more likely to
restrict itself to determining the actual losses suffered by the
plaintiff. 88
2. Special Procedures for Verdicts
Courts can complement the use of this cautionary instruction by
using special verdicts and general verdicts accompanied by interrogatories. 89 When the court adopts a special verdict, the judge asks the
jury to answer written questions upon each issue of fact, and the
court then reaches a verdict by applying the law to the jury's factual
fi.ndings. 90 A general verdict accompanied by interrogatories also requires the jury to answer written questions submitted by the judge
on specific factual issues. Under this procedure the jury still returns
a normal liability and damage verdict.91
These procedures offer useful tools for minimizing jury manipulation, because they encourage the jury to focus on the specific issues
88. The instruction will probably have less effect on the problem of a jury reducing its
award than on a jury increasing its award. A jury aware of trebling must infer that "questions
of fairness" includes adjustments to offset the plaintiffs windfall. If the jury does not infer this,
it may lower its award to offset the perceived windfall to the plaintiff. In contrast, a jury
unaware of trebling is explicitly told not to impose its value judgments. In this situation, the
instruction does not rely on an inference.
89. Rule 49 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a court to use either of these
procedures at its own discretion. FED. R. C1v. P. 49. See generally 38 ANTITRUST L.J. 95-97
(1968-69) (proceedings of the National Institute on Preparation and Trial of Antitrust Treble
Damage Suits, American Bar Assn., Nov. 7-8, 1968) (discussing the use of rule 49 procedures
from the tactical perspectives of antitrust litigants).
The MCI court also suggested use of a special master on remand to assist in the determination of damages. See MCI Commn. Corp. v. ATT, Nos. 80-2171, 80-2288 (7th Cir., Jan. 12,
1983) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Newer file) n.122. This suggestion is of limited
utility in controlling jury manipulation. First, rule 53(b) provides that "reference to a master
shall be the exception and not the rule." Second, in a jury trial, the master's report is not even
a discretionary guide to the fact-finder, as it would be in a bench trial; instead, the report is
read to the jury as evidence, and subject to attack by the parties. While the report may serve
the important functions of providing the jury with a reasonable standard to fall back on, and
of informing appellate review of the damage determination, so long as the jury is inclined to
manipulate damages a third estimate added to that of the plaintiff and the defendant may have
limited impact. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 53.
90. Nordbye, Use of Special Verdicts, 2 F.R.D. 138, 139 (1941). The court gives the jury
such instructions and explanations as are necessary to answer the questions. FED. R. C1v. P.
49(a). Cautionary instructions, such as the one proposed in this Note, would accompany a
special verdict charge.
There is a split in the federal courts on whether to inform the jury of the legal effect of its
answers. Compare Gullett v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 446 F.2d llOO (7th Cir. 1971),
with Lowery v. Clause, 348 F.2d 252, 261 (8th Cir. 1965). Presumably courts using special
verdicts in antitrust cases would not inform the jury of the treble damage provision. Since
jurors are not told the legal effect of the damage determination when a general verdict is used,
see note 18 supra and accompanying text, courts should not inform them of the legal effect of
the special verdict questions on damages.
91. Rule 49 provides for special procedures if the answers to the interrogatories are inconsistent with the general verdict, inconsistent with other answers, or both. FED. R. C1v. P. 49(b).
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involved in a case.92 By requiring the jury to reach a factual determination on each theory of damages advanced by the plaintiff, the
court forces the jury to concentrate on these theories instead of simply providing a lump sum damages figure. 93 Additionally, these procedures simplify the jury's task by identifying specific questions,
instead of leaving the jury broad discretion to unsort a large aggregate of complex facts. 94
Appellate courts have already suggested that trial judges make
more use of these devices in complex antitrust cases. In addition to
reducing the likelihood of jury manipulation, the use of these procedures facilitates appellate review of jury decisions. 95 Because the
92. See Lowrey v. Clause, 348 F.2d 252, 260 (8th Cir. 1965); Moore-McCormack Lines,
Inc. v. Maryland Ship Ceiling Co., 311 F.2d 663, 669 (9th Cir. 1962); 9 C. WRIGHT & A,
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 2511 (1971); Nordbye, supra note 90, at 139.
But see Personal Injury IJamage Award, supra note 2, at 162.
93. Kalven noted that juries tend to think of recoveries as single sums, rather than analyzing each recovery as a sum of component damage awards. He felt a more effective instruction
could make the jury conscious of its duty to compute the component sums. See Personal I,y'ury
IJamage Award, supra note 2, at 161. Even when judges have used special verdicts in verdicts
in antitrust cases, they have used open-ended questions on damages. After asking detailed
questions to establish an antitrust violation, courts typically ask for a lump sum damage figure
for each violation. See, e.g., E. DEVITT & C. BLACKMAR, supra note 18, § 90.43; SECTION OF
ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 18, at 193-204.
Such a "lump sum" technique may be an important cause of jury manipulation. Since this
technique does not require the jury to consider each theory of damages carefully, the jury can
award what it deems a reasonable amount without limiting itself to the amount suggested by
the merits of each separate theory. As this approach allows a significant amount of discretion,
the jury may not feel that it is disregarding the judge's instruction if it arrives at an equitable
result
Special verdicts can be used to help control damage awards by forcing the jury to specifically decide the merits of each theory of damages advanced by the plaintiff. See Nordbye,
Comments on Selected Provisions of the New Minnesota Rules, 36 MINN. L. Rev. 672, 687
(1952) (noting that through the use of interrogatories accompanying a general verdict, courts
can direct the attention of juries to the important issues: "[t)oo often juries generalize in their
determinations . . . without deliberating upon the crucial questions which are conditions precedent to the general verdict").
94. Sunderland, Verdicts Special and General, 29 YALE L.J. 253, 259 (1919-20). To the
extent that this helps clarify the factual issues, and ease their resolution, it should reduce jury
manipulation. See note 85 supra and accompanying text.
95. See MCI Commn. Corp. v. ATT, Nos. 80-2171, 80-2288 (7th Cir., Jan. 12, 1983) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Newer file). The special verdict employed in that case detailed the theories of liability quite extensively, but reduced the issue of damages to a single
lump-sum question. Appendix, special verdict questions 1,7. Since the lost-profit study plaintiff offer to prove damages did not, and probably could not, separately account for the effect of
each claim of liability, the Court of Appeals could only remand for another determination of
damages. This illustrates both that special verdicts facilitate appellate review (for without the
special verdict on liability the appellate court could never have scrutinized the link between
the liability claims actually upheld by the jury and the damage award), and that special verdicts should be designed to encourage the more specific connection of damages with theories of
liability. MCI may present a case where the only available measure of damages, plaintiffs
study, measures only the cumulative impact of all liability claims - some of which were dismissed before trial. In such cases the trial will be dispositive only when defendant prevails on
all liability issues, unless the jury adjusts the damage estimate to account for liability claims
thrown out before trial or by the jury itself, in such a way as to survive appellate review. This
sort of adjustment may prove impossible, but is surely more likely if special verdicts relate
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procedures identify the theories of liability and damages that the
Jury relied on, appellate courts need not speculate on these matters in
determining whether the evidence supported the verdict. Additionally, if an appellate court reverses the jury on an issue, only that
specific issue need be retried, not the entire case.96 These advantages, together with the potential for minimizing jury manipulation,
strongly recommend the use of the rule 49 procedures. 97
CONCLUSION

Kalven and Zeisel, in their epic work on the jury system, conclude that the jury embodies "a daring effort in human arrangements
to work out a solution to the tensions between law and equity and
anarchy." 98 Without challenging the wisdom of this effort, it is clear
that jury behavior can often impede the just enforcement of the antitrust laws. This Note offers a modest solution to this problem. But
this restraint should not obscure the genuine need for additional guidance to the jury in assessing antitrust damages, even as it underscores the absence of serious disadvantages to the proposed
procedures. By following the approach advocated here, courts will
better harmonize the use of the jury as a fact-finder and the policies
advanced by private antitrust suits.

liability claims directly to damage estimates. Such procedures also encourage plaintiffs to devise damage estimates which can be adjusted for adverse judgments on some liability claims,
potentially avoiding retrials in situations like MCI.
Appellate courts have suggested that trial judges make more use of these devices in complex antitrust cases. See SuperTurf, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., No. 80-1484, slip op. at 19 n.14 (8th
Cir. Oct. 2, 1981); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263,279 (2d Cir. 1979).
96. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 279 (2d Cir. 1979).
97. In spite of these advantages, commentators have noted that these procedures are rarely
used. See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 92, § 2505. One reason is that trial judges
are often pressed for time and these procedures require extra work. See Gunn, The Jury System and Special Verdicts, 2 ST. MARY'S L.J. 175, 178 (1970). To ease the workload, the judge
could ask counsel to submit proposed jury instructions. Indeed the courts should do everything possible to ensure accurate verdicts in large, complex cases. Precisely because these cases
involve so huge a commitment of judicial resources, the costs of error increase accordingly. It
has also been suggested that these procedures impermissibly intrude upon a jury's freedom.
Justices Black and Douglas in fact considered the devices an unconstitutional impairment of
the right to a jury trial. See 374 U.S. 861, 867-68 (1963) (dissenting from the amendments to
Rule 49). In the context of treble damage actions, this argument is unpersuasive, since jury
freedom can undercut the important policies served by such actions, and can lead to results
which the jury itself would consider inequitable.
98. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 1, at 499.

